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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(j), as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment awarding two

parcels of land to the Holdens under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6P.3d 1129.
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: With respect to the South parcel (the
strip) of property, this issue was addressed by the Aults in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 331). Objection to
inclusion of the west parcel was made at oral argument and in response to the proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 499 1 6, R. 501).
2.

Did the judgment signed by the district court erroneously state that the

Holdens were entitled to the disputed property because the Aults' deed failed to close,
and because Aults' warranty deed was subject to the Holdens alleged rights of
possession?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An order granting summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129.

1

PRESERVATION IN RECORD: This issue was addressed below by the Aults in
their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
331).
3.

Did the district court err in concluding that no material issue of fact

existed with respect to the Aults' claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and
trespass?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's order granting summary judgment
with respect to the Aults' other causes of actions is reviewed de novo by this Court.
Jones v. ERA Brokers Consolidated, 2000 UT 61, 6 P.3d 1129.
PRESERVATION IN RECORD BELOW: This issue was addressed by the Aults
in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
331), and in objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R.
501).
4.

Did the trial judge err in awarding attorney's fees against the Aults

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the Aults' Complaint was without merit is
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Pennington v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998). A finding of bad faith is a question of fact
regarding subjective intent, which is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Id. Whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are
2

sufficient is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998).
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: Attorney fees were mentioned
by the Holdens in their answer to the complaint and in the submission of proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which the Aults objected. (R.22-16, 498
1 3).
5.

Did the trial judge err in awarding costs to the Holdens?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: A challenge to an award of costs based upon
timeliness or insufficiency of description is a question of law reviewed de novo. Lyon
v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 1 77, 5 P.3d 616.
PRESERVATION IN THE RECORD BELOW: The Aults filed a timely
Objection to the Holdens' memorandum of costs. (R. 537).
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1).
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d).
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in
a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an
3

appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide
the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed,
a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements
in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified
stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A
party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of
the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the
court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served
and filed on the date judgment is entered.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
On November 30, 1998, the Aults filed a complaint against the Holdens in the
Third District Court in and for Tooele County. The complaint set forth four causes of
action: (1) quiet title, (2) conversion of personal property, (3) unjust enrichment, and
(4) trespass. (R. 7). The Holdens filed an answer to the complaint which denied the
four causes of action and requested that the complaint be dismissed and the Holdens be
awarded "their costs and expenses." (R. 22-16). The Holdens subsequently filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings which was denied.
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Following discovery by the parties, the Holdens filed a motion for summary
judgment on February 8, 2000. (R. 279). On June 5, 2000, oral argument was heard
on the Holdens' motion for summary judgment. Judge Young indicated that he would
grant the Holdens' motion for summary judgment twice during the argument (R. 810 at
24, 29), but decided that he would further consider the matter and took the decision
under advisement (R. 810 at 26, 30).
On June 20, 2000, the trial court granted summary judgment and issued a
Memorandum Decision. (R. 489; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 1). Counsel for
the Holdens, Parker M. Nielson, prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and the Summary Judgment for Judge Young's signature. The Holdens' attorney,
Parker Nielson, filed a withdrawal of counsel on June 29, 2000. (R. 495). The Aults'
filed objections to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Summary
Judgment and a request for oral argument, but on July 18, 2000, the Court signed the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Summary Judgment (R. 515, 517;
Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 2) and entered a written order entitled "Ruling"
which denied oral argument and the objections, and entered the signed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment order. (R. 508; Addendum of the Appellee
Exhibit 1). The Aults timely filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2000. (R. 526).
The final Summary Judgment contained an award of attorney fees and costs to
Holdens. (R. 517). On July 18, 2000, the court clerk mailed a copy of the "Ruling" to the
5

Aults' attorney and Holdens' former attorney, Parker Nielsen. (R. 507). On July 26, 2000,
the Holdens received a letter from Parker Nielsen, dated July 25, 2000, which enclosed the
"Ruling" from the Court. (R. 550). This letter was the first notice the Holdens received of the
entry of the order. (R. 547).
On August 1, 2000, the Holdens, pro se,filedthe Verified Memorandum of Attorneys
Fees and Costs. (R. 523; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 3). On August 17, 2000,
the Defendants, through their new counsel, Scott A. Broadhead, requested an extension of
time tofilethe Memorandum of Costs. (R. 549). The Aults objected to the memorandum
of costs. Subsequently, the Holdens' former attorney, Parker Nielsen, filed a Motion
for Order Fixing Amount of Attorney Fees (R. 564). Over the Aults' objections and
denying the Aults' request for oral argument, Judge Young awarded the Holdens'
$3,518.65 in costs and granted the motion awarding the Holdens $13,550.00 in
attorney fees. (R. 804, 807). The Aults timely filed a notice of appeal on November 3,
2000. (R. 812). The two cases were consolidated by order of this Court on December
12, 2000.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 1962, the Aults purchased the property known as the John C.
Sharp home and farm in Vernon, Utah from Clarence M. Plant and Anna M. Plant
Ross pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract, which was filed with the Tooele
County Recorder's Office in 1962. (R. 253; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 4).

6

Upon payment in full of the purchase price, a warranty deed was executed by Plant and
Ross on June 15, 1972, and was recorded by the Aults on August 22, 1975 (R. 256;
Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 5).
In 1969, the Holdens began leasing the property on the south adjacent to the
Aults' property. On March 21, 1973, the Holdens purchased this property. Holdens
hold a warranty deed dated March 21, 1973, recorded with the Tooele County
Recorder on April 9, 1973. (R. 13, 515; Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 6). The
warranty deed to the Aults property is dated June 15, 1972 and recorded subsequent to
the recording of Holdens' deed with the Tooele County Recorder on August 22, 1975.
(R. 515). On February 26, 1976, the Holdens purchased a thin, triangular piece of
property from Don Gowans. (R. 248 1f5, 515). This property is adjacent on the west
to the Aults' and the Holdens' properties (Figure 1, highlighted in blue).
Based upon the deeds of the Aults and Holdens, on July 5, 1998, the Aults had
the property which is the subject of the dispute surveyed by D.H. Jensen and
Associates, Inc. ("Jensen Survey" herein). (Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 7).
The Aults's warranty deed describes the property by metes and bounds as follows:
A parcel of land beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the
Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter
of Section 29 in Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake
Meridian, thence East 9.10 chains (600.601), to the center of the
county road, thence North along the center of said County Road,
4.47 chains (295.02'), thence West 5.73 chains (378.18'), thence
North 3.57 chains (235.62'), thence West 2 chains (132.00'),
7

thence North 0°50f West 1.69 chains (111.54'), thence West 1.35
chains (89.10'), thence North 4.28 chains (282.48') , thence North
70°30' West 10.29 chains (679.14'), thence South 4°32' West 8.70
chains (574.20'), thence South 59°03' East 11.12 chains (739.86'),
thence South 1.77 chains (96.43') to the place of beginning,
containing approximately 17 acres. (Addendum of the Appellants
Exhibit 5).
On its face, the Jensen Survey shows that the "Ault deed does not close."
(Addendum of the Appellants Exhibit 7). The warranty deed to the Aults property is
"SUBJECT TO...the rights of parties in possession and to all existing easements and
rights of way." All of the courses in the warranty deed to Aults are defined except the
last course. The last course in the warranty deed to Aults reads: "thence south 1.77
chains to the place of beginning."
Part of the disputed property consists of a strip of land (highlighted in yellow)
approximately 30 feet wide by 553 feet long (hereinafter "the strip"). The north side
of the strip is marked by a fence which begins at the county road and runs west to a
point approximately 26 feet from the Aults' west border and then turns northward.
From this point the fence runs north for approximately 115 feet and then on an angle
northwest. The resulting piece is known as the "western parcel" (highlighted in
orange), which is also in dispute.
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Figure 1 - Jensen Survey

The Jensen Survey correctly shows the fence between the premises occupied by
the Aults and the Holdens. The fence shown on the Jensen Survey was in existence
prior to June 15, 1972 and has been in existence for at least sixty nine (69) years and
for as long as residents of Vernon can remember (R. 369, 515; Addendum of the
Appellants Exhibit 7).
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The Holdens have been in possession of the disputed property since 1969 (R.
515). The disputed property is correctly described in the Jensen Survey as follows:
Beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the Southwest corner of
the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 29 in
Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence East 9.10 chains (600.60'), to the center of the county road,
thence North along the center of said County Road thirty feet (30'),
more or less, to the Boundary Fence, thence Westerly along said
Boundary Fence 9.10 chains (600.60') to a point north of the place
of beginning, thence South forty-five feet (45') more or less, to the
place of beginning. (The strip).
and
Beginning at a point 10.27 chains North of the Southwest corner of
the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 29 in
Township 8 South, Range 5 West, of the Salt Lake Meridian,
thence North two hundred forty feet (240'), more or less, to a
fence line shown on the Jensen Survey, thence South 59°03' East
along said fence line thirty-seven feet (37'), more or less, to an
angle in the fence, thence South one hundred fifteen feet (115'),
more or less, to said Boundary Fence, thence West along said
Boundary Fence thirty feet (30'), more or less, to an intersection
with the first call. (The western parcel).
During a period in the 1970's, the Aults' property was leased to a party by the
name of DuBois for a boys ranch, which resulted in a lawsuit between the Aults and
DuBois.
The Aults obtained a survey in connection with the lawsuit with DuBois, which
survey, together with what the Aults already knew, led the Aults to believe that the
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description to the property in the Warranty Deed dated June 15, 1972, extended
approximately 30 feet south of the Boundary Fence shown on the Jensen Survey.
The Aults, subsequent to filing the Complaint, obtained two deeds from the
Gowans dated February 8, 1999. It is the Aults' erroneous position that the recently
obtained deeds from Gowans "close the description of the Ault property."
The Aults constructed a wooden rail fence on their property, more than fifteen
years ago, subsequent to the DuBois lawsuit, consisting of three wooden 2x8 rails (the
"Rail Fence"), secured on posts, and painted white. The fence was constructed by Leo
Ault, personally. The Aults' Rail Fence ends at the line of the old fence line between
the premises occupied by Holdens shown on the Jensen Survey, and does not include
the disputed property.
The Aults planted coniferous trees along the fence line between the Aults'
property and property occupied by Holdens over a period of fifteen years, more or less.
There are presently 5 or 6 trees along the fence line. There were formerly several
additional trees planted by Ault along the fence line, but some have died. The trees
were planted by the Aults, personally. The coniferous trees planted by the Aults are
located along the fence line between the premises occupied by the Holdens shown on
the Jensen Survey, and none of them are on the Holdens1 side of the fence.
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The main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Aults' property was
installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975. Pipes for the irrigation system on
the Aults' property end at the Boundary Fence.
On Thanksgiving Eve, November 25, 1998, in the dead of night, Leo Ault
removed the fence marking the east boundary of the premises occupied by Holdens as
shown on the Jensen Survey, and admitted having done so to Deputy Tooele County
Sheriff Johnson.
On December 18, 1998, Leo Ault went on the premises occupied by Holdens
without their consent, and, with two male assistants, resorted to "self help" by
attempting to further remove and destroy the boundary fence shown on the Jensen
Survey, without asking for the assistance of the above-entitled Court, jurisdiction of
which was invoked by the Aults by the filing of their Complaint.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in this matter. There
is no material dispute in the facts and the legal conclusions made by Judge Young were
correct.
The trial court was correct in awarding title to the disputed property to the
Holdens pursuant to boundary by aquiesence. The elements of boundary by
acquiescence are (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long period of
12

time, (4) by adjoining land owners. The Aults concede that the first and fourth
elements were established.
The trial court found that the parties acquiesced to the fence as the boundary
line. In support of this finding, the court made the following findings of facts: (1) Leo
Ault constructed a wooden rail fence on his property, more than fifteen years ago,
which ends at the line of the old fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens,
and does not include the disputed property; (2) the Aults planted coniferous trees along
the fence line between the Ault property and property occupied by Holdens over a
period of fifteen years, more or less, and none of them are on the Holdens1 side of the
fence; (3) the main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Ault property was
installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975, and the pipes for the irrigation
system on the Ault property end at the Boundary Fence; (4) in the mid-80fs, the
Holdens built a shed on the disputed property, but the Aults did nothing; (5) the Aults
were aware that the fence was not the legal boundary line at various times, but "did not
seek to oust the Holdens from occupying the disputed property;"
The Aults argument is that the parties did not acquiesce to the fence as the
boundary line because the parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they
know the location of the true boundary. However, the parties can acquiesce to the
fence as a boundary even if they know, or should know, the location of the true
boundary. In this case, the facts are clear that the Aults came to know, at some point,
13

that the fence was not the true boundary. Yet through their indolence, the Aults
acquiesced to the fence as a boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for
almost thirty years and even built structures on the property in the 1980fs, yet the Aults
did nothing.
The trial court was correct ruling in the Aults' deed was insufficient to convey
title. The Jensen survey declares on its face that the "Ault deed does not close" by
more than 100 feet. Thus, the Aults' deed describes nothing at all, and certainly
nothing adverse to or inconsistent with Holdens1 prior recorded title. It merely
describes a line, which makes various courses through the farmlands surrounding
Vernon, failing to come back to the point of beginning.
The pleadings establish that the Holden deed was dated March 23, 1973, and
recorded April 9, 1973. The Ault deed was dated June 15, 1972, but was not recorded
until August 22, 1975. Therefore, under Utah's "race to the registry" system, the
Holden deed prevails as to any conflict between the two. Examination of the Holdens'
deed will disclose that it contains several calls which are not tied to metes and bounds
descriptions, but to natural monuments on the ground. The east boundary runs to the
edge of and north along the county road. The north boundary is tied to the boundary of
the Plant property, predecessor in interest to Ault. The pleadings establish that in
1973, and before that from at least 1969, and for more than sixty-nine years according
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to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the north boundary of the Plant property was
the boundary fence.
The Aults' other causes of action fail because the disputed property was
rightfully possessed by the Holdens. An order which awards title of the disputed
property to the Holdens and then finds that they trespassed on that property would be
completely illogical. The tort of tresspass is totally inconsistent with the doctine of
boundary by acquiesence. The causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment
concern the same allegations that the Holdens used the water and pipes which were on
the disputed property. The factual basis consists of some vague allegations in the
complaint. Essentially, the Aults argue that the Holdens stole the pipe and water which
was on the disputed property, which seems to contradict the doctine of boundary by
acquiesence. There was no merit to these claims both factually and considering the
courts ruling on the issue of title to the disputed property.
The trial courts' findings and order support the award of attorney fees and the
order should be affirmed. There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to
support the finding that the Aults' claim lacked merit and that the claim was asserted in
bad faith. The record is replete with evidence of bad faith and lack of merit, including
(1) filing a complaint to quiet while having a deed which failed to close and was subject
to the rights of parties in possession, the Holdens, (2) the complaint, together with the
answers to discovery, establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence in favor of
15

the Holdens, (3) the record shows that the Aults' resorted to self-help prior to the
filing of the complaint and resorted to self-help a second time after the filing of the
complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the trial court, by going on the property
and removing and altering the fences, (4) the trial court entered a temporary restraining
order as a result of the Aults attempts at self-help which direct them to not go on the
property or disturb the fences, (5) the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going
on the property and attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an
order to show cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt, (6) the Aults
conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs, and (7) before the
filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could not afford to fight a
quiet title action (R. 566).
The trial court was correct in accepting the memorandum of costs as
timely and legally sufficient. The Holdens likewise acted diligently and were not at
fault for filing their memorandum late. The "Ruling" was entered and mailed by the
clerk on July 18, 2000 to Parker Nielsen, who had withdrawn from the case. The
Holdens actually received a copy of the "Ruling" on July 26, 2000 and then filed a
memorandum of costs within the five day period after receiving notice. The Holdens
complied with the five-day time period for filing the memorandum of costs when
considering the facts of this case in the light of the Utah Supreme Courts decision in
Board ofComm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997).
16

Rule 54(d)(2) requires that the Holdens file a memorandum "duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been
necessarily incurred." Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs
meet this requirement exactly. The memorandum was verified and the affiant clearly
stated that the costs were necessarily incurred.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING THE
PARCELS TO THE HOLDENS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.

The elements of boundary by acquiescence are set forth by the Utah Supreme
Court in Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981). (See also Staker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990); Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock,
993 P. 2d 229 (Utah App. 1999). Goodman held that to establish ownership of a
disputed parcel there must be (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,
fences, or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (3) for a long
period of time, (4) by adjoining land owners. The Aults concede that the first and
fourth elements were established (R. 489, Brief of Appellants 21).
A.

Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary.

The trial court found that the parties acquiesced to the fence as the boundary
line. In support of this finding, the court made the following findings of facts:
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1.

The Aults constructed a wooden rail fence on his property, more

than fifteen years ago, subsequent to the DuBois lawsuit, consisting of three wooden
2x8 rails (the "Rail Fence"), secured on posts, and painted white. The fence was
constructed by Leo Ault, personally. The Ault's Rail Fence ends at the line of the old
fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens shown on the Jensen Survey, and
does not include the disputed property. (R. 489, 515).
2.

The Aults planted coniferous trees along the fence line between the

Ault property and property occupied by Holdens over a period of fifteen years, more or
less. There are presently 5 or 6 trees along the fence line. There were formerly several
additional trees planted by the Aults along the fence line, but some have died. The
trees were planted by the Aults, personally. The coniferous trees planted by the Aults
are located along the fence line between the premises occupied by Holdens shown on
the Jensen Survey, and none of them are on the Holdens' side of the fence. (R. 489,
515).
3.

The main line for the pressurized irrigation system on the Ault

property was installed by the Vernon Irrigation Company ca. 1975. Pipes for the
irrigation system on the Ault property end at the Boundary Fence. (R. 489, 515).
4.

Sometime in the mid-80's, the Holdens built a shed on the disputed

property, but the Aults did nothing. (R. 489).
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5.

The Aults were aware that the fence was not the legal boundary

line at various times, but "did not seek to oust the Holdens from occupying the disputed
property." (R. 489).
The Aults argument is that the parties did not acquiesce to the fence as the
boundary line because (1) the fence was not built to be boundary, (2) the parties cannot
acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they know the location of the true boundary,
and (3) it is not acquiescence if the Aults granted permission for the use of the
property.
1.

The fence was not built to be boundary.

The Holdens acknowledge that the fence was not built to be a boundary. This
fence was built approximately 69 years ago, before either the Aults or the Holdens
possessed their parcels. In many cases the original purpose of the fence is an important
factor. However, in this case the original purpose of the fence is irrelevant. The trial
court in no way relied upon this fact in making its ruling.
2.

The parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a boundary if they know the

location of the true boundary.
The Aults cited Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah
App. 1999) for the proposition that the parties cannot acquiesce to the fence as a
boundary if they know the location of the true boundary. Wilkinson quoted Nunley v.
Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962), when it stated "that if there is no uncertainty as to
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the location of the true boundary line the parties may not, knowing where the true
boundary line is, establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place. *
Although this is persuasive language, this interpretation of the law does not hold
up when compared to other cases. The law of boundary by acquiescence has shifted
and evolved significantly over the past forty years. Nunley was written in 1962 when
uncertainty of the boundary line appeared to be essential to a claim of boundary by
acquiescence. However, in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court clearly held that objective uncertainty of the boundary line is not an
element of boundary by acquiescence.
Furthermore, to hold that uncertainty of the true boundary line is an element of
the doctrine contradicts the "indolence" cases. In Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801,
806 (Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
[According to [Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973)], a
landowner may acquiesce to a boundary through "indolence." And while
"indolence" has no agreed-upon legal definition, it is generally defined as
"laziness or inactivity arising from a love of ease or aversion to work;
indisposition to labor." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1154 (1986). Therefore, landowners may acquiesce to a boundary through
idleness or laziness. In other words, a landowner whose property has been
encroached upon acquiesces to the boundary when he or she "either had
or should have had knowledge that his [or her] property was being
claimed by another.
Therefore, the parties can acquiesce to the fence as a boundary even if they
know, or should know, the location of the true boundary. In this case, the facts are
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clear that the Aults came to know, at some point, that the fence was not the true
boundary. Yet, through their indolence, the Aults acquiesced to the fence as a
boundary line. The Holdens possessed the property for almost thirty years and even
built structures on the property in the 1980's, yet the Aults did nothing.
3.

It is not acquiescence if the Aults granted permission for the use of the

property.
The facts indicate that the Holdens did lease the Aults' property from 1972 to
1977 for farming (R. 260, 688-83). However, this lease was terminated more than
twenty years ago. The trial court found that the mutual acquiescence occurred from
"not less than 1978 to 1998." (R. 489, 487). The Aults have tried to characterize the
Holdens' management of the Aults' property over various periods of time from 1982 to
1997 as a lease and, therefore, permissive use. The Aults argue that the Holdens
managed the Aults' entire parcel in exchange for one-half of the crops raised. (R. 68584, lines 20-25). However, there are no credible facts which support that any lease
existed for the disputed property. The purpose of the lease or management agreement
was for farming. However, there were never any crops raised on the disputed
property. In reality, the 1972-77 lease and the later so-called lease never involved the
disputed properties. The "leases" concerned the farming areas of the Aults' property.
The Aults try to equate Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999) to this
case. Edgell was about someone giving oral permission to leave a picnic table which
21

rested over the property line. The facts of Edgell hardly equate to the Aults allowing
the Holdens to build a shed on the disputed property. The Aults never gave express
permission for the Holdens to possess the disputed property, let alone to build
structures on the property. The Aults characterize their actions as granting permissive
use to the Holdens, when reality is that their behavior was pure "indolence."
B.

For a long period of time (at least 20 years).

The trial court found that the mutual acquiescence occurred from "not less than
1978 to 1998/' (R. 489, 487). The facts indicate that the Holdens did lease the Aults'
property from 1972 to 1977 (R. 260, 688-83). As was argued above, the Holdens
were in possession of the disputed property for more than twenty years. The disputed
property was never part of the 1972-77 lease or the later lease or management
agreement involving the farming areas of the property, and therefore, the use of the
property was not permissive. The Holdens occupation of the property far exceeded the
twenty year requirement.
The trial court was correct in finding that no material issues of fact existed and
that all four requirements of boundary by acquiesence were met.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT AULTS'
DEED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVEY TITLE.

A.

Failure of Aults' Deed to Close.

The Jensen survey declares on its face that the " Ault deed does not close."
(Addendum of Appellants Ehibit 7). Reference to the survey discloses that the lack of
closure is by more than 100 feet. Thus, the Aults' deed describes nothing at all, and
certainly nothing adverse to or inconsistent with Holdens1 prior recorded title. It
merely describes a line, which makes various courses through the farmlands
surrounding Vernon, failing to come back to the point of beginning.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that an "indenture's language
describing the conveyed land [which] is imprecise" fails to "convey title to the disputed
land." Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324 (Utah 1998), citing with approval, Coleman v.
Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) ("It is not to be questioned that in order to
be valid, a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description to identify the property
it conveys.") The Ault deed is imprecise and, therefore, fails to "convey title to the
disputed land."
The authoritative American Law of Property (1952) declares the controlling
principle at § 12.46 "that an instrument should be held ineffective as a conveyance if it
fails to show on its face, or by reference, the particular land to which it relates."
Elaborating at Id, § 12.105, p.413:
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In order that a description may have the certainty necessary
for validity, there must be a complete set of boundaries.
Even a plat is insufficient if it leaves the extent of a lot
undetermined for lack of a boundary on one side.
Accordingly, a description by metes and bounds, whether
along natural or artificial boundaries or by courses and
distances, must be by continuous lines, one commencing
where the other leaves off and the final line returning to the
point of beginning. If the description does not "close."
either expressly or by construction, the grant fails for lack
of coverage of any tract of land." (Footnotes omitted,
emphasis added.)
Utah has given the principle announced by the American Law of Property literal
effect. Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 193, 367 P.2d 193 (1962) held a metes and
bounds description ineffective to convey title because of a failure to close. Figure 2,
taken from the published report of the Howard case, shows plotted lines very similar to
those of the Ault deed, as plotted by the Jensen Survey. The district court held the
"warranty deed a nullity for failure to convey anything" and the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that the "grantor's intention should be given effect if reasonably
determinable. However, we consider that under the facts here a grant is not
sustainable. Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in mind or,
conjecture indulged, one would have to divine that any number of areas could be said to
have been intended." The Ault's name need only be substituted for Howard's and the
Howard case describes the facts herein, precisely.
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Figure 2: Plat from Howard v. Howard.
B.

Words "to the place of beginning" Fail to Salvage the Ault Deed.

The lack of closure in the Ault deed shown by the Jensen Survey, immediately
west of the barn, in the very spot where Ault removed Holdens' fence on Thanksgiving
Eve, is neither trivial nor susceptible of any reasonable construction that would salvage
the deed. The Aults' contend that the description is completed by the phrase "to the
place of the beginning." Reference to the Jensen Survey (Figure 1) demonstrates that
extension of the final call could not "close" the description. It would merely continue
the final call south, never returning to the point of beginning.
In addition, the Aults' deny that there is any mistake in their deed, by their
answer to 2d Interrogatories No. 10, as follows:
INTERROGATORY NO, 10: Is it your claim or
contention that there is a mistake in the Ault deed alleged in
paragraph 3 of the complaint?
25

ANSWER:... .Plaintiffs do not contend that there was a
mistake in the Ault deed alleged in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint. (R.263).
Therefore, the deed fails (1) because it fails to close1 and (2) because Utah law
prohibits its construction to close, by the introduction of parol.
C.

Ault's Deed may not be "Construed" to Close.

We acknowledge the rule that mutual mistake in deeds may be ignored if the
intention of the parties can be determined. That doctrine cannot salvage the Ault deed,
however, for deeds are construed according to the law of contracts, Hansen v. Stichting
Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Utah 1995) . "[P]arol evidence
may not contradict, vary, or add to deeds." Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah
1979). The terms of the deed may not be varied by parol, for "all provisions of the
prior contract are usually merged into the deed; and when a party denies merger due to
mistake, he has the burden to show mistake by clear and convincing evidence." Ibid.
(Italics by the court, citations omitted.)
"[A] party seeking reformation of a deed due to mutual mistake must plead such
mistake with particularity" pursuant to Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ibid.

1

Ault relied upon Lossee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132 (Utah 1951) at the September 27, 1999,
hearing, dealing with "mutual mistake" under common conveyances to the heirs of Alice Ann
Jones. The case is inapposite, for Ault has disclaimed "mistake" and for further reason that Ault
and Holden do not hold under common conveyancesfromthe same grantee. Lossee v. Jones
defeats the contention of Ault, in any event, for it held that inclusion of the words "more or less"
in the final call "constitute a tolerance factor which enables the extension of the final distance" so
that the deed closed. The Ault deed does not contain the words "more or less."
26

Ault has not done so and, moreover, affirmatively denied at 2d Interrogatories 110 that
there was any mistake. (R. 263).
Even if mistake had been alleged, and could be considered by the Court, the
issue, we submit, must be resolved by reference to the boundary fence. American Law
of Property relies upon the early case of Park v. Wilkinson, 60 Pac. 945 (Utah 1900),
where a deed failed to close because one course extended to the center of Canyon
Creek, but the course stated was 66 feet short of Canyon Creek. The Utah court held
that "[t]he natural monuments [v/z., Canyon Creek] govern and control the other
description." The Holden deed is therefore controlled by the natural monuments on the
grounds, referred to in the deed, and any construction of the Ault deed must also be
controlled by the natural monuments on the ground, in this case the boundary fence.
D.

The Holden Deed Describes the Property and is Prior in Time.

The pleadings establish that the Holden deed was dated March 23, 1973, and
recorded April 9, 1973. The Ault deed was dated June 15, 1972, but was not recorded
until August 22, 1975. Therefore, under Utah's "race to the registry" system, the
Holden deed prevails as to any conflict between the two.
Holden took possession of the disputed property in 1969, prior to his 1973 deed,
under a lease from Joyce Sharp. The boundary fence, in its original location, is shown
on the Jensen Survey. Holden has thus held the property, bounded by the fence line,
for thirty (30) years, and it was in existence when Aults acquired their property.
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Examination of the Holdens' deed will disclose that it contains several calls
which are not tied to metes and bounds descriptions, but to natural monuments on the
ground. The east boundary runs to the edge of and north along the county road. The
north boundary is tied to the boundary of the Plant property, predecessor in interest to
Ault. The pleadings establish that in 1973, and before that from at least 1969, and for
more than sixty-nine years according to the Pehrson sworn statement (R. 396), the
north boundary of the Plant property was the boundary fence.
These facts are confirmed by the survey of D. Rosenberg, dated November 1,
1969. The Rosenberg survey establishes not only that the Holden deed described the
disputed property but that the location of the boundary fence was in precisely same
place in 1969 that it is today, as confirmed by the Jensen Survey, the Pehrson statement
and by the Aults' admissions.
The uniform real estate contract of Aults in 1962 does not alter the facts. Such a
contract is not a conveyance. "While the vendee under such a contract is considered to
be the equitable owner, the legal title is in the vendor until the contract is performed
and a conveyance executed" and the contract "raises no legal inference that possession
of the property is to be given before the deed is to be executed." Pitcher v. Lauritzen,
423 P.2d 491, 494 (Utah 1967), quoting from 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, §
385 at p. 808. Accord., Wiscombe v. Lockhart, 608 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1980),
holding that "[t]itle to the property remained in [the seller]," citing Jeffs v. Citizens
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Finance Co., 7 Utah 2d 106, 319 P.2d 858 (1958), explaining that "the assignee of a
real estate contract securing a loan may elect whether to perform the real estate contract
or not." On the facts herein, the real estate contract, even if it could be considered,
would not alter the defects in Auks' title, for reference to it reveals that it contains the
same description, the same failure to close, and the same provision that it is subject to
rights of parties in possession.
E.

The Boundary Fence Placed Aults on Notice of Holdens' Claim of Title.

It is uncontroverted and agreed that the warranty deed of Aults is dated June 15,
1972, and recorded August 22, 1975. Further agreed is that the Boundary Fence has
been in existence since prior to June 15, 1972. The law is clear in such circumstances
that the Ault deed is subject to actual notice of claims of parties in possession as
evidenced by the boundary fence. Nix v. Tooele County, 118 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah
1941), holding the purchaser subject to notice of "facts which would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge" of an adverse
claim of title. Accord., Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983); McGarry v.
Thompson, 201 P.2d 288 (Utah 1948) ("because such occupancy was sufficient to put a
reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, and such inquiry would have led to actual
knowledge of the rights under which the defendants held possession, and of the state of
the title.")
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A variant of estoppel, a claimant is barred by inaction when there is a duty to
act. Utah State Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity Co., 140 P.2d 763
(Utah 1943). Accord., Hilton v. Sloan, 108 Pac. 689 (Utah 1910) ("preventing] a
party from taking dishonest and unconscientious advantage of his strict legal
rights... .consistently with good faith and practice") "[Principles of equity and justice
are universal [and] they apply wherever appropriate and necessary to enforce rights or
to prevent oppression and injustice." Williamson v. Wanless, 545 P.2d 1145, 1148
(Utah 1976) See also, Blackhurst v. Transamerica, 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985);
Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1988) The doctrine is
established herein by Holdens' long, quiet possession of the disputed property and
erection of substantial improvements thereon, including the shed, exercise and
motorcycle repair facility.
F.

Deeds from Gowans Fail to Close the Deed to Ault.

The Aults1 Answers to Holdens1 2d Interrogatories also explode the alternate
contention that two deeds obtained from Gowans close the description to the Ault
property. The two deeds reveal that they are quit claim deeds dated February 8, 1999.
(R. 259-58). Holdens held title to the very property described in the Gowans deed of
February 8, 1999, under a deed from Gowans dated February 26, 1976. The quit
claim deeds of February 8, 1999, were thus executed more than 1 year and 2 months
after filing of the Complaint-by persons who are apparent strangers to title. Certainly
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they are not executed by the grantors as the Aults allege. The Jensen survey illustrates
that the Go wans deed could not "close" Aults' description, for Holdens hold title to a
triangular piece between the end of Aults' final call and the place of beginning.
This Court needs no citation of authority for the proposition that a quit claim
deed from a stranger to title conveys nothing. Neither is authority needed that a quit
claim deed from a stranger is not a correction of the deed of a record owner, or
correction of a deed alleged in the Complaint.
m.

NO MATERIAL DISPUTES OF FACT EXISTED WITH RESPECT
TO THE AULTS' OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION.

The Aults' other causes of action fail because the disputed property was
rightfully possessed by the Holdens. An order which awards title of the disputed
property to the Holdens and then finds that they trespassed on that property would be
completely illogical. The tort of tresspass is totally inconsistent with the doctine of
boundary by acquiesence. If a party can be awarded title to property by the doctine of
boundary by acquiesence and then be sued for trespass, the doctine of boundary by
acquiesence would become void, as a practical matter.
The causes of action for conversion and unjust enrichment concern the same
allegations that the Holdens used the water and pipes which were on the disputed
property. However, the factual basis for these claims is very weak. The factual basis
consists of some vague allegations in the complaint. No discernable discovery was
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undertaken to establish these claims. Essentially, the Aults argue that the Holdens stole
the pipe and water which was on the disputed property, which seems to contradict the
doctine of boundary by acquiesence. There was no merit to these claims both factually
and considering the courts ruling on the issue of title to the disputed property.
IV.

THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE AULTS.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith

"
In this case, the Aults argue that because the Memorandum of Decision issued

by Judge Young did not mention the award of attorney fees that, therefore, it was not
Judge Young's intention to award attorney fees. It is clear from the record that Judge
Young reviewed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 515) and the
Summary Judgment (R. 517). He reviewed the objections by the Aults and specifically
denied them. (R. 508). Furthermore, the request for costs and fees was not a surprise.
The Holdens requested "their costs and expenses" in the answer to the complaint (R.
22-16).
There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that
the Aults' claim lacked merit and that the claim was asserted in bad faith. The Holdens
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are not asserting that the award of attorney fees was granted simply because summary
judgment was granted, nor that it should be denied because boundary by acquiescence
is a complicated area of the law. The Holdens were granted an award of attorney fees
because of the behavior of the Aults.
The record is replete with evidence of bad faith and lack of merit. First, the
Aults' complaint shows, on its face, that they were without title for the dual reasons
that the conveyance alleged failed to close and, if it had, was subject to the rights of
parties in possession, the Holdens. Pursuit of a complaint not even alleging title, the
basic and first element of any quiet title action is the epitome of lack of merit. Second,
the Aults' complaint, together with the answers to discovery, establish the elements of
boundary by acquiescence in favor of the Holdens. Third, the record shows that the
Aults' resorted to self-help prior to the filing of the complaint and resorted to self-help
a second time after the filing of the complaint, in disregard of the jurisdiction of the
trial court, by going on the property and removing and altering the fences. (R. 249,
515). Fourth, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order as a result of the
Aults attempts at self-help which direct them to not go on the property or disturb the
fences. (R. 62, 208). Fifth, the Aults disregarded the temporary order by going on the
property and attempting to construct a new fence, resulting in a motion for an order to
show cause why the Aults should not be held in contempt. (R. 155). Sixth, the Aults
conducted abusive discovery for the purpose of running up costs. (R.557). Seventh,
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before the filing of the suit, Mr. Ault told Mr. Holden that he (Holden) could not
afford to fight a quiet title action (R. 566).
The trial courts' findings and order support the award of attorney fees and the
order should be affirmed.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING COSTS.

A.

The Memorandum was timely filed.

Ruled 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a memorandum
of costs must be filed within five days of entry of the judgment. However, in Board of
Comm'rs of State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme
Court upheld the District Judges' order granting an extension of time to file a
memorandum of costs. In the Petersen case, the Bar did not find out about the
judgment until nine days after it was entered because of some clerical errors in the
district court office. When the Bar found out about the judgment, it filed a
memorandum of costs and a request for an extension of time. The Court recognized
that the Bar had acted diligently and that the late filing of the memorandum of costs was
not the fault of the Bar.
In this case, the Holdens likewise acted diligently and were not at fault for filing
their memorandum late. The "Ruling" was entered and mailed by the clerk on July 18,
2000. However, the clerk mailed the "Ruling" to Parker Nielsen, who had withdrawn
from the case. (R. 508). The Holdens actually received a copy of the "Ruling" on July
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26, 2000. (R. 547-44). The Holdens filed a memorandum of costs within the five day
period after receiving notice. The Holdens, acting pro se, did not request an extension
of time when they filed their memorandum of costs on August 1, 2000, but later filed a
request for an extension of time.
The Holdens have complied with the five day time period for filing the
memorandum of costs when considering the facts of this case in the light of the Utah
Supreme Courts decision in Petersen. The Holdens found out about the "Ruling" eight
days after it was entered through no fault of their own. Upon finding out about the
"Ruling", the Holdens acted diligently in filing the memorandum of costs.
B.

The memorandum complies with the requirements of Rule 54(d)(2).

Rule 54(d)(2) requires that the Holdens file a memorandum "duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been
necessarily incurred." Holdens' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs
meets this requirement exactly. The memorandum was verified and the affiant clearly
stated that the costs were necessarily incurred. The Aults argue that the memorandum
of costs must contain more than what the clear language of the stature requires.
The Aults are well aware of the depositions in this case and their necessity in
establishing the underlying facts supporting the Holdens' Motion for Summary
Judgment. The costs were outlined in the bills submitted as part of the memorandum of
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costs. In fact, when Judge Young denied the Holdens Motion on the Pleadings, he
suggested that further discovery was needed.
The trial court was correct in accepting the memorandum of costs as timely and
legally sufficient.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellees respectfully request that the order
granting summary judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this j S day of January, 2001.

S&)tt A. Broadhead
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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ADDENDUM
1.

Ruling

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEO H AULT,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs,

Case No: 980300772

DARRELL C. HOLDEN,
Defendant

Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG
Date: 07/18/2000

Clerk: lucilleh
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Objections to
the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court
having fully considered the objections, denies Respondent's
Objections and request for oral argument. The Court entered and
signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as the
Order of Summary Judgment this 12th day of July, 2000.
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